Strategic overview of Oceania by Paskal, Cleo
Asia Paciﬁc Bulletin 
Strategic Overview of Oceania  
BY CLEO PASKAL 
Oceania typically refers to the vast area of the Paciﬁc Ocean covered by Australia, New Zealand, over a 
dozen Paciﬁc Island Countries (PICs), and a wide range of other dependencies, territories, and aﬃliated 
states (including the United States’ Guam, American Samoa, Northern Marianas, Midway, etc...). It covers 
close to one sixth of the planet’s surface and is the strategic front line between Asia and the Americas. 
 
Throughout the Cold War, from 1945 to the early 1990s, Oceania was considered solidly ‘West‐friendly’, 
with major American and BriƟsh diplomaƟc and military engagement in the region. AŌer the end of the 
Cold War, the general strategic percepƟon was that the area was less criƟcal and reasonably secure. The 
United States shiŌed its focus to other zones, and the UK closed several High Commissions in the Paciﬁc 
Islands. Washington and London largely handed ‘strategic oversight’ of the region to its “Five Eyes” 
intelligence‐sharing partners Australia and New Zealand.  
 
That lack of interest is changing. In the past decade Indonesia, Japan, India and especially France (which 
has territories in Oceania) have all deepened engagement with PICs. 
 
By far the most eﬀecƟve and disrupƟve new engagement in the region has come from China. Through soŌ 
loans, scholarships, immigraƟon, commercial acƟvity, military‐to‐military cooperaƟon and diplomaƟc 
engagement, Beijing has been taking eﬀecƟve advantage of weaknesses in Western regional policies in 
order to dramaƟcally widen and deepen its inﬂuence in Oceania—including in Australia and New Zealand 
which have seen high proﬁle cases of Chinese aƩempts to inﬂuence domesƟc poliƟcs and external 
policies.   
 
China’s inﬂuence eﬀorts in Oceania have global implicaƟons. Already, hotspots within the “ﬁrst island 
chain” include the South and East China Seas where China is building new islands and challenging 
sovereignty claims of Southeast Asian countries and Japan. The “second island chain”, including Guam, has 
come under threat from China and North Korea, and is being increasingly militarized. The PICs are largely 
within the “third island chain” – bricks in the ‘Paciﬁc wall’ China would want to co‐opt and control as it 
seeks to constrain US inﬂuence to the line centered on Hawaii.  
 
Also of interest to Beijing, selected countries within Oceania could oﬀer valuable refueling and 
transshipment hubs for traﬃc to and from South America. China and France are already in discussions to 
use French Polynesia as such a hub.  
 
In addiƟon to these geopoliƟcal and geoeconomic shiŌs, the region is also witnessing unprecedented geo‐
physical change including severe weather events that are disrupƟng human security, physical 
infrastructure and economies. In a recent example, in February 2018, the main island of the Kingdom of 
Tonga was hit by the strongest cyclone in its recorded history. The Parliament building was destroyed, as 
were over $150 million in crops.  
 
The conﬂuence of major changes in all three of the ‘3 geos’ (geopoliƟcal, geoeconomic, and geophysical) is 
making the strategic picture in Oceania increasingly complex. AddiƟonally, in 2018, several events could 
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have long‐term repercussions, including: strategically important New Caledonia holding a 
referendum on independence from France; elecƟons scheduled in Cook Islands, French 
Polynesia, Fiji, and the Solomon Islands; Papua New Guinea hosƟng APEC; and Japan hosƟng 
its triennial Paciﬁc Islands Leaders MeeƟng, with a possible emphasis on mariƟme security.  
 
Given the changes, Australia and New Zealand are rethinking their role in the region. In early 
March 2018, the newly elected government in New Zealand announced a “Paciﬁc reset”. If 
taken seriously, this will be the ﬁrst Ɵme in a decade that Wellington truly reevaluates its 
regional relaƟonships. The goal will be to assuage what New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston 
Peters referred to as “strategic anxiety” in Oceania, and for New Zealand to become a true 
partner for regional countries. 
 
A potenƟal test case for the policy ‘reset’ involves the Paciﬁc Agreement on Closer Economic 
RelaƟons Plus (PACER Plus) free trade agreement. The deal was hasƟly pushed through by 
Australia and New Zealand (the laƩer under the previous administraƟon) in April 2017. It has 
yet to be raƟﬁed by parliaments of Australia, New Zealand or the nine PICs who signed on. PICs 
already have mostly duty‐free and quota free access to Australia and New Zealand and so it is 
diﬃcult to see the beneﬁt for them. 
 
PACER Plus is designed to do three things: have PICs drop tariﬀs for Australian and New 
Zealand goods; ‘harmonize’ PIC economies with Australian and New Zealand economies; and, 
as the New Zealand government’s own NaƟonal Interest Analysis wrote: “preserve New 
Zealand’s posiƟon against major compeƟtors from outside of the region in the years to come” 
via ensuring that PICs “will pass the beneﬁts of any future liberalizaƟon and commitments 
made in Free Trade Agreements concluded with other partners to New Zealand investors and 
service exporters due to sound most favored‐naƟon commitments.”  
 
In this case, the ‘other partners’ aren’t China, they are the United States, the European Union, 
Japan, India and others. PACER Plus is more about increasing PICs’ economic dependence on 
Australia and New Zealand than about increasing growth in the region.  
 
Under diplomaƟc pressure, several PICs signed (but have yet to raƟfy) PACER Plus. The US 
Freely Associated States (Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands and Palau) have yet 
to sign, as the deal could disadvantage their economic relaƟons with the US. The large 
economies of Fiji and Papua New Guinea refused. Fiji objected to the “very restricƟve” third 
party most favored naƟon clause. Papua New Guinea pulled out saying the deal was in 
Australia and New Zealand’s favor, a ‘complete waste of Ɵme’ and it would ‘kill’ its 
manufacturing sector.  
 
The push, or lack thereof, for PACER Plus raƟﬁcaƟon will be a major story to watch in 2018. 
RaƟﬁcaƟon has the potenƟal to severely fragment the PICs and weaken PIC economies, 
opening the door for more Chinese loans (and so strategic leverage) across the region. It could 
also open the door for Chinese‐funded Australian or New Zealand based companies to use 
PACER Plus to gain access to PICs criƟcal infrastructure, including ports, airports and telecoms. 
 
Whether or not Australia and New Zealand persist in trying to get the deal raƟﬁed will show if 
there is truly a policy reset by Canberra and Wellington, or if the West’s key regional partners 
in Oceania are reverƟng to business as usual and puƫng the interest of narrow domesƟc 
economic lobbies ahead of regional growth and security — a model that has failed them, their 
allies, and the people of the region for too long.  
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